イギリス：対イラク戦争の責任追及、記事4本
Goldsmith admits change of heart after visit to US
By Alex Barker, Political Correspondent
Published: January 28 2010 02:00 | Last updated: January 28 2010 02:00
Lord Goldsmith, the former attorney-general, admitted yesterday that he reached a "different view" on the legality of the Iraq war after a trip to Washington, but said it was "utter nonsense" to suggest he had bowed to political pressure.
In six hours of exhaustive testimony before the Iraq inquiry, the most senior law officer to Tony Blair, the former premier, strongly defended certifying the war as legal, but conceded giving "overly cautious" advice in the days before the invasion.
His testimony came as Sir John Chilcot, the inquiry chairman, expressed his "frustration" over delays in declassifying key documents - triggering a political row over the government allegedly trying to "gag" the inquiry.
Lord Goldsmith described for the first time the influences and turning points in his evolving legal judgment.
Until a month before the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Lord Goldsmith held serious doubts over the legal basis for the use of force, warning Mr Blair several times that an explicit United Nations resolution was necessary. One piece of unsolicited advice was described as making Mr Blair "uncomfortable". Lord Goldsmith said he changed his mind after "a combination" of discussions in that February with Jack Straw, foreign secretary at the time, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Britain's then ambassador to the UN, and senior US officials in Washington.
He finally revised his advice to give a "green light" for military action after his visit in February 2003 to the US, where he was convinced that US and UK interpretations of secret UN negotiations supported a "reasonable case" that old UN resolutions justified military action.
He denied that political consequences - including the possible collapse of the Labour government - had influenced his decision.
He argued that "the most powerful factor" in changing his mind was France's willingness to pass resolution 1441 in November 2002 that said the UN Security Council would "consult" over Iraq's compliance with weapons inspectors rather than "decide". He said Sir Jeremy and Mr Straw made clear that the French "knew they had lost" the argument over whether military force was an option when agreeing to that wording. Paris eventually blocked a second UN resolution.
Senior US officials also impressed on him that they would never have "stumbled" into giving France a veto over going to war - the US president's one red line.
He said: "Frankly it is extremely unlikely that all these experienced negotiators in Washington and New York could actually have allowed themselves to concede something which was behind the red line."
But he admitted that, with hindsight, he was "overly cautious" in his formal advice of March 11 2003, which said only that there was a "reasonable case" for military action. "Our troops deserved more," he said. A later statement said the war was legal in categorical terms.
In earlier testimony, Lord Goldsmith said he warned Mr Blair in late January, before a key meeting with George W. Bush, US president, that he still thought a second UN resolution would be necessary to justify war.
Leaked minutes of the subsequent White House meeting, in which a timeline for war was set, do not note Mr Blair making any mention of the legal advice he had received. Mr Blair gives evidence tomorrow.
Timeline
November 2002 UN passes resolution 1441. Lord Goldsmith "pessimistic" that it justifies the use of force January 2003 Lord Goldsmith warns Tony Blair that a second resolution is necessary February 10 Senior US officials tell Lord Goldsmith 1441 authorises force; he changes judgment. March 7 Mr Blair given legal opinion saying past resolutions make a "reasonable case" for war; Lord Goldsmith warns this could fail in court March 13 Lord Goldsmith says the "better view" is that a second resolution is unnecessary and war legal March 20 First air strikes on Iraq
Blair faces first cross-examination
By Alex Barker, Political Correspondent
Published: January 28 2010 22:06 | Last updated: January 28 2010 22:29
Tony Blair
Tony Blair in Basra in 2003: he faces a grilling on his style of leadership and the part this played in leaving Britain unprepared for occupation
Tony Blair is well practised in dealing with allegations of deceit over the invasion of Iraq. But if he is exposed on Friday at the Chilcot inquiry into the war it might be because of the chasm between his global ambitions and Britain's long-waning power.
Through the course of six hours on the witness stand, the former prime minister will be grilled on the biggest and most controversial aspects of this unpopular war: the alleged misuse of intelligence; his alleged "secret" promises to the US; the legality of the conflict; and his true motive for toppling Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader.
But many of the answers will be all too familiar. More telling could be the first detailed cross-examination of his style of government, decision by decision, and the part this played in leaving Britain stunningly unprepared for an unwelcome occupation.
Mr Blair is witness number 69 in an inquiry that has already taken 150 hours of testimony, ranging from defiant valedictories to mandarins exacting revenge. It has also revealed legions of opportunities missed and warnings from Whitehall that were undetected, overlooked or poorly addressed.
Election fears
When Tony Blair faces the Iraq inquiry on Friday he will be answering not only for himself but for a party that is braced for an election in under 12 weeks' time.
While the main thrust of questioning will cover his own decisions as prime minister, parts of his account may prove uncomfortable for some former colleagues still serving in government.
Gordon Brown has already found himself dragged into a politically troublesome inquiry that is reviving memories of a war that drained Labour support in the 2005 election.
Some witnesses have elaborated on his role as a close adviser to Mr Blair in the run-up to war. Any more details of Mr Brown's support could jar with an image of a chancellor who backed the policy at arm's length.
The question of whether military operations and reconstruction were adequately funded could emerge – although this will only be fully explored when Mr Brown testifies a month from now.
The political standing of Jack Straw, justice secretary, might also come under pressure. Mr Straw, who served as Mr Blair's foreign secretary, told the inquiry of his "regrets" over the loss of life in a war about which he had made clear his reservations to Mr Blair.
Yet later evidence has shown his pivotal role in convincing Lord Goldsmith, the attorney-general, that the use of military force was legal without a second UN resolution.
Mr Blair might expand on Mr Straw's "concerns" and reveal whether the foreign secretary willingly intervened with the attorney-general.
No country is ever completely prepared to invade and occupy another. What Mr Blair must address is whether, as a junior partner in a superpower's war of choice, he took on responsibilities that Britain's government lacked the capacity, means or plans to fulfil.
"This is the sort of key lesson: don't get into a position where you have responsibility and accountability but you don't have power," Lord Turnbull, the former cabinet secretary, told the inquiry. "That is exactly the position we were in and I think all your witnesses have described how uncomfortable this was."
The main areas the inquiry is set to cover are:
The Bush-Blair relationship
The extraordinarily close relationship between Mr Blair and George W. Bush, the then US president, will come under intense scrutiny as the inquiry assesses what promises were exchanged in the run-up to war.
One turning-point was the Crawford summit of 2002, where Sir Christopher Meyer, the former ambassador to the US, suggested to the inquiry that a commitment to use all means necessary to disarm Saddam might have been "signed in blood".
The key documents are three personal letters that Mr Blair wrote to Mr Bush, which remain classified. The former reason will be pressed on what pledges he made, whether these matched his public statements, and whether they best applied Britain's leverage.
This will feed into a larger theme: Britain's role as a junior partner. One panel member compared the military power gap to "a sardine against a whale". Lord Turnbull testified to the "discomfort" of being a "10 per cent shareholder" while still having to "carry in your area full responsibility".
The use of intelligence
The intelligence failures in the run-up to the war are well documented. But Mr Blair will face tough questions over his use of two phrases.
The first is a statement that intelligence had "established beyond doubt" that Saddam was producing weapons of mass destruction. Officials had warned him that the intelligence picture on Iraq was "patchy" and "poor". The second is his claim in the Commons that Saddam's weapons of mass destruction programme was "growing", a claim for which panel members say they are struggling to find evidence.
The legality of the war
This week the inquiry heard the most senior Foreign Office lawyers saying the war had "no basis in law". Meanwhile Lord Goldsmith, Mr Blair's most senior law officer, admitted changing his mind over its legality just six weeks before military action.
Did Mr Blair seek to influence that decision? And was he aware that Whitehall's foremost experts on international law considered the military action to be a "crime of aggression"?
He will also be asked why he appeared reluctant to take formal advice at an early stage. Lord Goldsmith said Mr Blair was "uncomfortable" after receiving an unsolicited warning that a second UN resolution was necessary for war. A day later at the White House Mr Blair agreed a timeline for war – but no minute exists of him raising the attorney-general's advice.
Style of government
Mr Blair will be asked whether his reliance on a close group of like-minded advisers undercut cabinet government and excluded dissenting views. So minimal was cabinet debate before the war that Lord Turnbull described it as having "degenerated". Other witnesses described how sensitive information was withheld from Clare Short, a cabinet minister and sceptic on the war, because of fears over leaks.
Plans for the aftermath
Two facts stand out on post-war planning. The first is that Mr Blair was warned within days of the war that the US "plan was to have no plan". The second is that British officials and generals were unaware they would be responsible for the Basra region until two weeks after the invasion.
Mr Blair raised concerns with Mr Bush. The question is whether he did enough. These obvious shortcomings had little bearing on UK decision-making. One choice Mr Blair made was pivotal: sending an entire army division. Had a smaller military contribution been made, Britain would not have been responsible for occupying a region of Iraq.
The inquiry has often asked what advice Mr Blair took on the Iraqi reaction to invading forces. As Sir John Sawers, the current head of MI6, told the panel: "Frankly, had we known the scale of the violence, it might well have led to second thoughts about the entire project."
Awkward moment for government
By Alex Barker
Published: January 29 2010 02:00 | Last updated: January 29 2010 02:00
When Tony Blair faces the Iraq inquiry today he will be answering not only for himself but a party that is braced for an election in less than 12 weeks' time, writes Alex Barker .
While the main thrust of questioning will cover his own decisions as prime minister, parts of his account may prove uncomfortable for some former colleagues still serving in government.
Gordon Brown has already found himself dragged into a politically troublesome inquiry that is reviving memories of a controversial war that drained Labour support in the 2005 election.
Some witnesses have elaborated on his role as a close adviser to Mr Blair in the run-up to war. Any further details of Mr Brown's support could jar with an image of a chancellor who backed the policy at arm's length.
The question of whether military operations and reconstruction were adequately funded could emerge - although this will only be fully explored when Mr Brown testifies a month from now.
The political standing of Jack Straw, justice secretary, may also come under pressure. Mr Straw, who served as Mr Blair's foreign secretary, recently told the inquiry of his "regrets" over the loss of life in a war about which he had made clear his reservations to Mr Blair.
Yet later evidence has shown his pivotal role in convincing Lord Goldsmith, the attorney-general, that the use of military force was legal without a second United Nations resolution.
Mr Blair may expand on Mr Straw's "concerns" and reveal whether the foreign secretary willingly intervened with the attorney-general.
Iraq inquiry puts Blair back in the spotlight
By James Blitz in London
Published: January 29 2010 02:48 | Last updated: January 29 2010 02:48
Tony Blair, Britain's former prime minister, has tried hard to stay out of the UK spotlight since he quit Downing Street in 2007, giving few interviews and beavering away as Middle East negotiator and celebrity speech-maker.
But on Friday he will be forced to make a dramatic return to the nation's TV screens when he gives a full day of testimony to Britain's official inquiry into the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
For about six hours, broadcast live on television, Mr Blair will be questioned by a five-strong panel, led by Sir John Chilcot, over why he took Britain to war.
Mr Blair is no stranger to such questioning. Since 2003 there have been no fewer than four British inquiries into the most controversial foreign policy decision taken by a UK prime minister in half a century. Mr Blair has appeared before all the inquests, none of which delivered the decisive blow to his reputation that the media had anticipated.
Yet this final inquiry may do far more damage. Since its official launch last July, it has proved to be the most thorough. It has thrown new light on the Blair government's flawed assessment of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction and the failure to prepare adequately for the war. It has also revealed how divided senior civil servants were about whether an invasion was legal under international law.
The key questions
● Did Tony Blair give a private pledge to George W. Bush after they met in Crawford, Texas, in spring of 2002 that he would back war in any circumstances? What did he write in letters to Bush at that time? Can those letters be published?
● Why did Mr Blair regard patchy intelligence that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction as definitive?
● Why did Mr Blair ignore the warning of his top counter-terrorism official that the invasion would trigger a rise in jihadist attacks in Britain?
● Why did Mr Blair leave it so late to ask his attorney-general whether the war was legal? Lord Goldsmith, the attorney-general, originally thought that the war was illegal. Was he put under pressure to change his mind?
● Why were British preparations for the aftermath of the invasion so poor? Senior military figures have said that they were told not to plan for war in late 2002 because it would undermine diplomatic efforts to end the crisis. Was this justified?
Mr Blair's detractors are hoping that Friday's appearance – and the inquiry's verdict – will deliver the coup de grâce they have long sought for a man they deem a war criminal. Some believe Mr Blair will be especially vulnerable to the accusation that he privately pledged to George W. Bush, the then US president, long before the invasion that he would back military action whether or not there was a United Nations resolution authorising such force.
Others expect Mr Blair to emerge unscathed. "The inquiry's five questioners engage their witnesses a little bit like parish doctors inquiring after a patient's health," says a senior civil servant. "They're not really out to draw blood." Besides, say some, even if the inquest were more aggressive, Mr Blair's charm and political skills would probably fend off any attacks.
The first round of hearings began last November and are expected to conclude next month. More hearings are expected in June and July, before the inquiry makes its official report to parliament.
If there has been a dominant theme of the hearings so far, it is the "revenge of the mandarins" – the biting criticism of Mr Blair made by top civil servants in the Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence and even Downing Street itself. Many have made public for the first time their doubts about the way he took decisions.
Sir Christopher Meyer, the former British ambassador to Washington, told the inquiry, for example, that Mr Blair "signed in blood" his commitment to go to war when he met Mr Bush in Crawford, Texas, in the spring of 2002.
The two top legal advisers to the Foreign Office spelled out this week how they repeatedly warned Mr Blair's government that the invasion would be illegal and "an act of aggression", but were overruled.
Mr Blair may have some uncomfortable moments on Friday. But as long as he can argue that he believed in good faith that Saddam possessed WMD, it will be difficult for his critics to allege that he knowingly lied to the public ahead of the war.
With Mr Blair no longer part of the government, the inquiry is unlikely to damage Labour's prospects in this year's general election, widely expected to be held in May. Gordon Brown, the prime minister, was finance minister at the time of the Iraq invasion and has long given the impression of not being involved in decisions on whether to go to war.
"Most British people decided a long time ago what they think about the war," says a former Labour cabinet minister. "I can't see that anything ... at this inquiry will change peoples' views [on who to vote for]."
By Alex Barker, Political Correspondent
Published: January 28 2010 02:00 | Last updated: January 28 2010 02:00
Lord Goldsmith, the former attorney-general, admitted yesterday that he reached a "different view" on the legality of the Iraq war after a trip to Washington, but said it was "utter nonsense" to suggest he had bowed to political pressure.
In six hours of exhaustive testimony before the Iraq inquiry, the most senior law officer to Tony Blair, the former premier, strongly defended certifying the war as legal, but conceded giving "overly cautious" advice in the days before the invasion.
His testimony came as Sir John Chilcot, the inquiry chairman, expressed his "frustration" over delays in declassifying key documents - triggering a political row over the government allegedly trying to "gag" the inquiry.
Lord Goldsmith described for the first time the influences and turning points in his evolving legal judgment.
Until a month before the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Lord Goldsmith held serious doubts over the legal basis for the use of force, warning Mr Blair several times that an explicit United Nations resolution was necessary. One piece of unsolicited advice was described as making Mr Blair "uncomfortable". Lord Goldsmith said he changed his mind after "a combination" of discussions in that February with Jack Straw, foreign secretary at the time, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Britain's then ambassador to the UN, and senior US officials in Washington.
He finally revised his advice to give a "green light" for military action after his visit in February 2003 to the US, where he was convinced that US and UK interpretations of secret UN negotiations supported a "reasonable case" that old UN resolutions justified military action.
He denied that political consequences - including the possible collapse of the Labour government - had influenced his decision.
He argued that "the most powerful factor" in changing his mind was France's willingness to pass resolution 1441 in November 2002 that said the UN Security Council would "consult" over Iraq's compliance with weapons inspectors rather than "decide". He said Sir Jeremy and Mr Straw made clear that the French "knew they had lost" the argument over whether military force was an option when agreeing to that wording. Paris eventually blocked a second UN resolution.
Senior US officials also impressed on him that they would never have "stumbled" into giving France a veto over going to war - the US president's one red line.
He said: "Frankly it is extremely unlikely that all these experienced negotiators in Washington and New York could actually have allowed themselves to concede something which was behind the red line."
But he admitted that, with hindsight, he was "overly cautious" in his formal advice of March 11 2003, which said only that there was a "reasonable case" for military action. "Our troops deserved more," he said. A later statement said the war was legal in categorical terms.
In earlier testimony, Lord Goldsmith said he warned Mr Blair in late January, before a key meeting with George W. Bush, US president, that he still thought a second UN resolution would be necessary to justify war.
Leaked minutes of the subsequent White House meeting, in which a timeline for war was set, do not note Mr Blair making any mention of the legal advice he had received. Mr Blair gives evidence tomorrow.
Timeline
November 2002 UN passes resolution 1441. Lord Goldsmith "pessimistic" that it justifies the use of force January 2003 Lord Goldsmith warns Tony Blair that a second resolution is necessary February 10 Senior US officials tell Lord Goldsmith 1441 authorises force; he changes judgment. March 7 Mr Blair given legal opinion saying past resolutions make a "reasonable case" for war; Lord Goldsmith warns this could fail in court March 13 Lord Goldsmith says the "better view" is that a second resolution is unnecessary and war legal March 20 First air strikes on Iraq
Blair faces first cross-examination
By Alex Barker, Political Correspondent
Published: January 28 2010 22:06 | Last updated: January 28 2010 22:29
Tony Blair
Tony Blair in Basra in 2003: he faces a grilling on his style of leadership and the part this played in leaving Britain unprepared for occupation
Tony Blair is well practised in dealing with allegations of deceit over the invasion of Iraq. But if he is exposed on Friday at the Chilcot inquiry into the war it might be because of the chasm between his global ambitions and Britain's long-waning power.
Through the course of six hours on the witness stand, the former prime minister will be grilled on the biggest and most controversial aspects of this unpopular war: the alleged misuse of intelligence; his alleged "secret" promises to the US; the legality of the conflict; and his true motive for toppling Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader.
But many of the answers will be all too familiar. More telling could be the first detailed cross-examination of his style of government, decision by decision, and the part this played in leaving Britain stunningly unprepared for an unwelcome occupation.
Mr Blair is witness number 69 in an inquiry that has already taken 150 hours of testimony, ranging from defiant valedictories to mandarins exacting revenge. It has also revealed legions of opportunities missed and warnings from Whitehall that were undetected, overlooked or poorly addressed.
Election fears
When Tony Blair faces the Iraq inquiry on Friday he will be answering not only for himself but for a party that is braced for an election in under 12 weeks' time.
While the main thrust of questioning will cover his own decisions as prime minister, parts of his account may prove uncomfortable for some former colleagues still serving in government.
Gordon Brown has already found himself dragged into a politically troublesome inquiry that is reviving memories of a war that drained Labour support in the 2005 election.
Some witnesses have elaborated on his role as a close adviser to Mr Blair in the run-up to war. Any more details of Mr Brown's support could jar with an image of a chancellor who backed the policy at arm's length.
The question of whether military operations and reconstruction were adequately funded could emerge – although this will only be fully explored when Mr Brown testifies a month from now.
The political standing of Jack Straw, justice secretary, might also come under pressure. Mr Straw, who served as Mr Blair's foreign secretary, told the inquiry of his "regrets" over the loss of life in a war about which he had made clear his reservations to Mr Blair.
Yet later evidence has shown his pivotal role in convincing Lord Goldsmith, the attorney-general, that the use of military force was legal without a second UN resolution.
Mr Blair might expand on Mr Straw's "concerns" and reveal whether the foreign secretary willingly intervened with the attorney-general.
No country is ever completely prepared to invade and occupy another. What Mr Blair must address is whether, as a junior partner in a superpower's war of choice, he took on responsibilities that Britain's government lacked the capacity, means or plans to fulfil.
"This is the sort of key lesson: don't get into a position where you have responsibility and accountability but you don't have power," Lord Turnbull, the former cabinet secretary, told the inquiry. "That is exactly the position we were in and I think all your witnesses have described how uncomfortable this was."
The main areas the inquiry is set to cover are:
The Bush-Blair relationship
The extraordinarily close relationship between Mr Blair and George W. Bush, the then US president, will come under intense scrutiny as the inquiry assesses what promises were exchanged in the run-up to war.
One turning-point was the Crawford summit of 2002, where Sir Christopher Meyer, the former ambassador to the US, suggested to the inquiry that a commitment to use all means necessary to disarm Saddam might have been "signed in blood".
The key documents are three personal letters that Mr Blair wrote to Mr Bush, which remain classified. The former reason will be pressed on what pledges he made, whether these matched his public statements, and whether they best applied Britain's leverage.
This will feed into a larger theme: Britain's role as a junior partner. One panel member compared the military power gap to "a sardine against a whale". Lord Turnbull testified to the "discomfort" of being a "10 per cent shareholder" while still having to "carry in your area full responsibility".
The use of intelligence
The intelligence failures in the run-up to the war are well documented. But Mr Blair will face tough questions over his use of two phrases.
The first is a statement that intelligence had "established beyond doubt" that Saddam was producing weapons of mass destruction. Officials had warned him that the intelligence picture on Iraq was "patchy" and "poor". The second is his claim in the Commons that Saddam's weapons of mass destruction programme was "growing", a claim for which panel members say they are struggling to find evidence.
The legality of the war
This week the inquiry heard the most senior Foreign Office lawyers saying the war had "no basis in law". Meanwhile Lord Goldsmith, Mr Blair's most senior law officer, admitted changing his mind over its legality just six weeks before military action.
Did Mr Blair seek to influence that decision? And was he aware that Whitehall's foremost experts on international law considered the military action to be a "crime of aggression"?
He will also be asked why he appeared reluctant to take formal advice at an early stage. Lord Goldsmith said Mr Blair was "uncomfortable" after receiving an unsolicited warning that a second UN resolution was necessary for war. A day later at the White House Mr Blair agreed a timeline for war – but no minute exists of him raising the attorney-general's advice.
Style of government
Mr Blair will be asked whether his reliance on a close group of like-minded advisers undercut cabinet government and excluded dissenting views. So minimal was cabinet debate before the war that Lord Turnbull described it as having "degenerated". Other witnesses described how sensitive information was withheld from Clare Short, a cabinet minister and sceptic on the war, because of fears over leaks.
Plans for the aftermath
Two facts stand out on post-war planning. The first is that Mr Blair was warned within days of the war that the US "plan was to have no plan". The second is that British officials and generals were unaware they would be responsible for the Basra region until two weeks after the invasion.
Mr Blair raised concerns with Mr Bush. The question is whether he did enough. These obvious shortcomings had little bearing on UK decision-making. One choice Mr Blair made was pivotal: sending an entire army division. Had a smaller military contribution been made, Britain would not have been responsible for occupying a region of Iraq.
The inquiry has often asked what advice Mr Blair took on the Iraqi reaction to invading forces. As Sir John Sawers, the current head of MI6, told the panel: "Frankly, had we known the scale of the violence, it might well have led to second thoughts about the entire project."
Awkward moment for government
By Alex Barker
Published: January 29 2010 02:00 | Last updated: January 29 2010 02:00
When Tony Blair faces the Iraq inquiry today he will be answering not only for himself but a party that is braced for an election in less than 12 weeks' time, writes Alex Barker .
While the main thrust of questioning will cover his own decisions as prime minister, parts of his account may prove uncomfortable for some former colleagues still serving in government.
Gordon Brown has already found himself dragged into a politically troublesome inquiry that is reviving memories of a controversial war that drained Labour support in the 2005 election.
Some witnesses have elaborated on his role as a close adviser to Mr Blair in the run-up to war. Any further details of Mr Brown's support could jar with an image of a chancellor who backed the policy at arm's length.
The question of whether military operations and reconstruction were adequately funded could emerge - although this will only be fully explored when Mr Brown testifies a month from now.
The political standing of Jack Straw, justice secretary, may also come under pressure. Mr Straw, who served as Mr Blair's foreign secretary, recently told the inquiry of his "regrets" over the loss of life in a war about which he had made clear his reservations to Mr Blair.
Yet later evidence has shown his pivotal role in convincing Lord Goldsmith, the attorney-general, that the use of military force was legal without a second United Nations resolution.
Mr Blair may expand on Mr Straw's "concerns" and reveal whether the foreign secretary willingly intervened with the attorney-general.
Iraq inquiry puts Blair back in the spotlight
By James Blitz in London
Published: January 29 2010 02:48 | Last updated: January 29 2010 02:48
Tony Blair, Britain's former prime minister, has tried hard to stay out of the UK spotlight since he quit Downing Street in 2007, giving few interviews and beavering away as Middle East negotiator and celebrity speech-maker.
But on Friday he will be forced to make a dramatic return to the nation's TV screens when he gives a full day of testimony to Britain's official inquiry into the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
For about six hours, broadcast live on television, Mr Blair will be questioned by a five-strong panel, led by Sir John Chilcot, over why he took Britain to war.
Mr Blair is no stranger to such questioning. Since 2003 there have been no fewer than four British inquiries into the most controversial foreign policy decision taken by a UK prime minister in half a century. Mr Blair has appeared before all the inquests, none of which delivered the decisive blow to his reputation that the media had anticipated.
Yet this final inquiry may do far more damage. Since its official launch last July, it has proved to be the most thorough. It has thrown new light on the Blair government's flawed assessment of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction and the failure to prepare adequately for the war. It has also revealed how divided senior civil servants were about whether an invasion was legal under international law.
The key questions
● Did Tony Blair give a private pledge to George W. Bush after they met in Crawford, Texas, in spring of 2002 that he would back war in any circumstances? What did he write in letters to Bush at that time? Can those letters be published?
● Why did Mr Blair regard patchy intelligence that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction as definitive?
● Why did Mr Blair ignore the warning of his top counter-terrorism official that the invasion would trigger a rise in jihadist attacks in Britain?
● Why did Mr Blair leave it so late to ask his attorney-general whether the war was legal? Lord Goldsmith, the attorney-general, originally thought that the war was illegal. Was he put under pressure to change his mind?
● Why were British preparations for the aftermath of the invasion so poor? Senior military figures have said that they were told not to plan for war in late 2002 because it would undermine diplomatic efforts to end the crisis. Was this justified?
Mr Blair's detractors are hoping that Friday's appearance – and the inquiry's verdict – will deliver the coup de grâce they have long sought for a man they deem a war criminal. Some believe Mr Blair will be especially vulnerable to the accusation that he privately pledged to George W. Bush, the then US president, long before the invasion that he would back military action whether or not there was a United Nations resolution authorising such force.
Others expect Mr Blair to emerge unscathed. "The inquiry's five questioners engage their witnesses a little bit like parish doctors inquiring after a patient's health," says a senior civil servant. "They're not really out to draw blood." Besides, say some, even if the inquest were more aggressive, Mr Blair's charm and political skills would probably fend off any attacks.
The first round of hearings began last November and are expected to conclude next month. More hearings are expected in June and July, before the inquiry makes its official report to parliament.
If there has been a dominant theme of the hearings so far, it is the "revenge of the mandarins" – the biting criticism of Mr Blair made by top civil servants in the Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence and even Downing Street itself. Many have made public for the first time their doubts about the way he took decisions.
Sir Christopher Meyer, the former British ambassador to Washington, told the inquiry, for example, that Mr Blair "signed in blood" his commitment to go to war when he met Mr Bush in Crawford, Texas, in the spring of 2002.
The two top legal advisers to the Foreign Office spelled out this week how they repeatedly warned Mr Blair's government that the invasion would be illegal and "an act of aggression", but were overruled.
Mr Blair may have some uncomfortable moments on Friday. But as long as he can argue that he believed in good faith that Saddam possessed WMD, it will be difficult for his critics to allege that he knowingly lied to the public ahead of the war.
With Mr Blair no longer part of the government, the inquiry is unlikely to damage Labour's prospects in this year's general election, widely expected to be held in May. Gordon Brown, the prime minister, was finance minister at the time of the Iraq invasion and has long given the impression of not being involved in decisions on whether to go to war.
"Most British people decided a long time ago what they think about the war," says a former Labour cabinet minister. "I can't see that anything ... at this inquiry will change peoples' views [on who to vote for]."
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